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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Governments and central banks around the world eased 
macroeconomic policies aggressively in response to the 2008 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, arguably forestalling a second Great Depres-
sion. More recently, however, policymakers have been talk-
ing about when to withdraw the stimulus. Th   is focus on exit 
is misguided. Current forecasts show an extended period of 
economic stagnation in the developed world. We need addi-
tional stimulus now. In particular, central banks in the main 
developed economies should push long-term interest rates 
75 basis points below the levels they would otherwise be by 
purchasing a combined $6 trillion in long-term public and 
private debt securities. Relative to current forecasts, this policy 
action is expected to boost GDP 3 percent or more over the 
next eight quarters and to reduce unemployment rates by 
between 1 and 3 percentage points.
Without additional stimulus, unemployment rates are 
likely to remain above equilibrium levels for many years at 
great cost to the world economy in terms of lost income and 
personal hardship. Moreover, with inﬂ  ation  rates  already 
below desired levels, excess unemployment threatens to cause 
an unwelcome fall in prices that would further damp recovery 
and retard the necessary process of deleveraging. 
In light of high and rising levels of public debt, additional 
monetary stimulus is preferable to additional ﬁ  scal stimulus. 
Indeed, monetary stimulus reduces the ratio of public debt to 
GDP by reducing interest expenses, increasing GDP, expand-
ing tax revenues, and enabling an earlier start to ﬁ  scal consoli-
dation.
Th  e  following  speciﬁ  c actions in the near term would help 
set the world into a solid recovery with stable prices and a 
return of economic activity to its trend growth path by the 
end of 2011: 
 Th   e Federal Reserve should purchase an additional $2 tril-
lion of longer-term debt securities with an average maturity 
of around seven years.
 Th   e European Central Bank (ECB) should lower its main 
reﬁ   nancing rate to 50 basis points, continue to extend 
unlimited 12-month credit to the banking system at this 
rate, and purchase €1 trillion of longer-term debt securi-
ties.
 Th   e Bank of Japan should state more clearly its intention to 
return inﬂ  ation to at least 1 percent over the next two years, 
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securities with an average maturity of around seven years, 
and commit to a further ¥100 trillion in such purchases 
in 2011 if core inﬂ  ation over the next 12 months remains 
negative.
 Th   e Bank of England should purchase an additional £200 
billion of longer-term sterling bonds or an equivalent 
amount of longer-term foreign-currency bonds with the 
interest and principal hedged using currency swaps.
Renewed asset price bubbles and ﬁ  nancial market excesses 
are unlikely in the current circumstances, but policymakers 
must be ready to use supervisory and regulatory tools to 
combat risky ﬁ  nancial activities should they occur.
DO WE NEED MORE MACROECONOMIC 
STIMULUS?
It is widely agreed that the four main developed econo-
mies—the United States, the euro area, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom—currently are experiencing considerable economic 
slack and rates of inﬂ  ation below the levels desired by their 
central banks. However, because macroeconomic policies 
operate only with a substantial lag, there is little that can be 
done to improve conditions in the immediate future. Rather, 
the policy choice today must be made with an eye to likely 
conditions beyond the next few months.
Studies typically ﬁ  nd that the peak eﬀ  ect of monetary 
policy on economic growth occurs after one year and the peak 
eﬀ  ect of monetary policy on inﬂ  ation occurs after two years.1 
Fiscal policies typically have a somewhat faster eﬀ  ect on the 
economy, but getting them through the legislative and execu-
tive hurdles to implementation takes time.2 Overall, the stance 
of monetary and ﬁ  scal policies should be aimed at returning 
economic activity (GDP) reasonably close to its maximum 
sustainable level within two years and returning inﬂ  ation 
close to its desired level over two to three years.3 Th  ere are 
times when these two goals may be in conﬂ  ict and policy must 
compromise between them, but such is not the case at present. 
Box 1 discusses the Taylor rule, which relates monetary policy 
to GDP and inﬂ  ation. 
1. See the chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Monetary Economics by 
Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2009). In terms of the level of GDP, the eﬀ  ect 
peaks around one to two years before dying out with the eﬀ  ect on employ-
ment peaking around, or just over, two years. In terms of the level of prices, 
the eﬀ  ect is permanent and largely completed after three years.
2. It is possible to design a ﬁ  scal policy with a nearly immediate eﬀ  ect on the 
economy after it is implemented (for example, a one-time cash transfer), but 
most ﬁ  scal policies have a more gradual eﬀ  ect.
3. A number of central banks generally aim to achieve their inﬂ  ation targets 
within a horizon of two years, including the Bank of England, the Bank of 
Canada, and the Swedish Riksbank.
Recent forecasts by private-sector economists, govern-
ment and international agencies, and central banks generally 
project years of lackluster growth and excess unemployment, 
with inﬂ  ation rates that are at or below desired levels. Most of 
these forecasts assume that the current stance of monetary and 
ﬁ  scal policy will be tightened only gradually. Th  e  projections 
of prolonged economic stagnation thus strongly suggest that 
the current stance of policies is too tight.
Moreover, the cost of allowing unemployment to remain 
high is even greater than lost income and personal hardships 
in the next few years. Economic research shows that high 
levels of unemployment erode worker skills and employability, 
which causes an economy’s structural rate of unemployment 
to rise (Blanchard and Summers 1986, Ball 2009). Getting 
back to the initial level of structural unemployment can take 
decades, with commensurate losses in economic output, not 
to mention social distress.
A common theme of most forecasts is that inﬂ  ation—
which currently is below the levels targeted by central banks—
will rise over the next two to three years. Such projections 
are not consistent with the standard accelerationist model, 
which predicts falling inﬂ   ation rates as long as the GDP 
gap is negative and/or excess unemployment is positive. Th  e 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) attributes the projected rise of inﬂ  ation to its view 
that inﬂ  ation expectations are well anchored at central bank 
target levels and that “speed-limit” eﬀ  ects push up prices when 
GDP grows faster than potential (OECD 2009, 65). However, 
in each of these economies, all previous occurrences of large 
negative GDP gaps since 1970 (using OECD estimates) were 
associated with declines in rates of inﬂ  ation that persisted 
throughout recoveries that were faster than those projected for 
2010 and 2011; inﬂ  ation rates subsequently rose only when 
GDP gaps turned positive. Given the large magnitude and 
expected long duration of excess unemployment and the rela-
tively modest growth rates projected, it is more reasonable to 
expect substantial further declines in rates of inﬂ  ation.4
Some have argued that economies take longer than normal 
to return to full employment after ﬁ  nancial crises (Reinhart 
and Rogoﬀ   2009). However, there is a wide range of growth 
outcomes after ﬁ  nancial crises, and the worst outcomes tended 
to be associated with the poorest policy responses.5 Th  e  goal 
of policymakers should be to learn from the past and achieve 
4. Indeed, in the United States the four-quarter changes in the employer cost 
index and hourly compensation have dropped sharply to levels not seen since 
World War II, suggesting that inﬂ  ation may decline further.
5. See IMF (2009). In some cases, such as Japan in the 1990s, the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis may have been caused or exacerbated by a structural slowdown in 
economic growth, which would vitiate any inference about the eﬀ  ect of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis on economic growth. NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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a better outcome than simply the average of past outcomes. 
In the current crisis, the zero bound on interest rates has 
been a major factor preventing monetary policymakers from 
doing as much as they otherwise would to speed recoveries. 
But, as discussed below, the zero bound is not a limit on what 
monetary policy can do. Th   ere is plenty of scope for further 
monetary stimulus. 
United States
Table 1 presents prominent forecasts of the US economy. 
Unless otherwise noted, the GDP growth rate and the inﬂ  a-
tion rates are four-quarter percent changes. Th  e unemploy-
ment rate is a percent of the labor force. Excess unemploy-
ment is the diﬀ  erence between the projected unemployment 
rate and the forecasting institution’s estimate of the structural 
or long-run unemployment rate. Th   e GDP gap is a percent of 
potential GDP. Except for the GDP gap, and unless otherwise 
noted, variables refer to the fourth quarter of each year.
Th  e Blue Chip, Federal Reserve (Fed), OECD, and 
Congressional Budget Oﬃ     ce (CBO) estimates of long-run 
unemployment are 5.8 percent, 5.1 percent, 5.0 percent, and 
4.8 percent, respectively.6 Based on these estimates, excess 
unemployment is currently around 4 to 5.5 percent, which 
is the highest level since the Great Depression according to 
the CBO’s historical estimates. All of these forecasts show 
excess unemployment continuing to exceed 3 percent of the 
labor force at the end of 2011, eight quarters from now, and 
exceeding 2 percent of the labor force at the end of 2012. 
6. Th   e OECD projects that structural unemployment will rise to 5.3 percent 
by 2011 and then return to 5.0 percent by 2017.
Such a degree and duration of slack in the labor market has 
not been witnessed since the Great Depression.7 Even the 
Mussa forecast, which is the most optimistic of these forecasts, 
shows an unemployment rate at the end of 2010 that is at least 
3 percentage points higher than any of the estimates of the 
structural rate of unemployment.
Th  e forecasts generally show modest GDP growth rates 
in 2010 with some pickup in 2011. However, these growth 
projections are far smaller than the 5 percent average GDP 
growth that occurred in the three years following each of the 
two previous recessions of comparable magnitude: 1974–75 
and 1981–82. Th  e GDP gaps are projected to remain large 
by historical standards in 2011. Th   e slowness with which the 
GDP gaps are projected to close is particularly striking in light 
of the fact that these forecasters project that potential GDP 
growth has temporarily slowed in the near term by as much as 
1.5 percentage points.
Th   e Blue Chip and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
forecasts have inﬂ  ation rates quickly rebounding to about the 
Fed’s desired level of close to 2 percent, whereas the Fed, the 
OECD, and the CBO see persistent shortfalls of inﬂ  ation 
below this level. 
Euro Area
Table 2 presents forecasts of the euro area economy. Th  e  data 
refer to annual averages or year-on-year changes, but are 
otherwise similar to those presented for the United States. Th  e 
unemployment rate is uniformly projected to increase over the 
next two years. Excess unemployment also is projected to rise 
notably next year. Th  e small drop in excess unemployment 
in 2011 is entirely accounted for by the OECD’s projection 
of an increasing rate of structural unemployment caused by 
the increase in actual unemployment, a process also known 
as hysteresis. Th  e increase in unemployment since 2008 is 
smaller than in the United States, despite a larger decline in 
GDP, likely reﬂ  ecting activist employment policies and subsi-
dies in some of the large euro-area countries. GDP growth is 
projected to be lackluster, with the GDP gap declining very 
little over the next two years.8 Inﬂ  ation is projected to remain 
below the ECB’s target of just under 2 percent through 2012. 
It is diﬃ   cult to overstate the bleakness of this outlook. 
7. Indeed, both CBO and OECD historical estimates show that excess unem-
ployment never exceeded 3 percent in even a single quarter for the 25 years 
from 1983 to 2008, including the 1990–91 and 2001 recessions.
8. Although the ECB did not publish a GDP gap in its December forecast, 
it noted that the output gap is projected to remain “signiﬁ  cantly negative” 
through 2011.
Without additional stimulus, unemployment 
rates are likely to remain above equilibrium 
levels for many years at great cost to the 
world economy in terms of lost income 
and personal hardship.  Moreover, with 
inflation rates already below desired 
levels, excess unemployment threatens 
to cause an unwelcome fall in prices that 
would further damp recovery and retard 
the necessary process of deleveraging.NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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Japan
Table 3 presents forecasts of the Japanese economy. Unemploy-
ment is projected to rise in 2010 and fall slightly in 2011. Th  e 
OECD’s projection of excess unemployment is large by Japanese 
historical standards. Th   e Japanese economy suﬀ  ered the largest 
drop in GDP of the four main developed economies. Forecast-
ers generally predict more rapid growth in Japan in 2010 and 
2011 than in the euro area, but the recovery is still slow by 
historical standards for such a sharp recession. Th   ere is consider-
able disagreement concerning the size of the GDP gap in Japan. 
Nevertheless, it clearly is negative and projected growth rates 
will not eliminate the GDP gap over the next two years.
Alone among these economies, Japan is currently experi-
encing signiﬁ  cant deﬂ  ation. Considering the substantial GDP 
gap and excess unemployment, forecasters are inexplicably 
optimistic that inﬂ  ation will return toward zero over the next 
few years. In any event, there seems to be little chance over the 
next three or four years of a return to the 1 percent inﬂ  ation 
rate that the Bank of Japan (BOJ) says it desires. 
United Kingdom
Table 4 displays forecasts of the UK economy. As in the US 
forecasts, Q4 data are used where available. Th  e unemploy-
ment rate is projected to rise next year and decline only 
modestly in 2011. Excess unemployment is projected to 
remain high and the GDP gap is projected to remain large 
through at least 2011. Notably, the Bank of England (BOE) 
(which does not publish a GDP gap) projects much faster 
GDP growth over the next two years than the other forecast-
ers, including Mussa, who has the highest GDP forecast for 
each of the other economies.9 Th  e BOE publishes two fore-
casts: one based on market expectations of rising future policy 
rates and one based on future short-term policy rates held 
constant at their current value of 0.5 percent. Not surprising-
ly, the forecast assuming the constant low policy rate projects 
a higher GDP growth rate and higher inﬂ  ation, with inﬂ  ation 
rising above target by late 2011. Presumably, the GDP gap 
implicit in the BOE-Constant forecast is closed by the end of 
2011, which suggests that the BOE’s estimate of the current 
GDP gap is smaller than those of other forecasters or that the 
BOE has a lower estimate of the potential growth rate than 
other forecasters. 
If the BOE’s view of the economic outlook is correct, then 
there is little need for additional macroeconomic stimulus in 
the United Kingdom. However, if most other forecasters are 
right, then there is a need for substantial additional stimulus.
9. Th   e BOE’s median growth projections are even larger than the mean projec-
tions shown here.
Box 1     The Taylor Rule
In 1993, John Taylor showed that the traditional US monetary policy instrument, the federal funds rate, could be well de-
scribed over the 1980s in terms of a simple relationship to infl  ation and an estimated GDP gap. Since the original Taylor 
(1993) paper, a number of studies have proposed alternative specifi  cations of policy rules. A common theme is that it would 
be optimal for central banks to respond more strongly, especially to GDP gaps, than in the original Taylor rule. (See, for ex-
ample, Rudebusch 2002, who also estimates a larger Fed response to the GDP gap than Taylor did.) However, these results 
are tempered somewhat by recognition of the substantial uncertainty surrounding estimates of the GDP gap (see box 2). 
Others have argued that it is not likely to be optimal for central banks to set policy solely on the basis of two variables. In 
particular, periods of unusual fi  nancial strains may call for lower policy rates than other times. (See, for example, Cechetti 
and Li 2005.)
 Krugman (2009), Guha (2009), and Rudebusch (2009) have cited diff  erent variants of Taylor-style rules to suggest that 
the ideal policy rate in the United States (as of mid-2009) was much lower than zero, around –5 to –7 percent. On the other 
hand, John Taylor recently argued that a rate near zero is about right for the United States (http://blogs.wsj.com/econom-
ics/2009/10/14/). Indeed, application of the original Taylor coeffi   cients to OECD estimates for US infl  ation and the GDP gap 
for 2009 Q4 yields a rate of about zero. However, applying the original Taylor coeffi   cients (assuming target infl  ation of 2 per-
cent in the euro area and the United Kingdom and 1 percent in Japan) to OECD estimates for 2009 Q4 yields rates of around 
–1 for the euro area and the United Kingdom and –3 for Japan. 
Obviously, important issues remain unresolved concerning the use of Taylor-style rules for policy analysis. But at least 
some versions of Taylor-style rules currently call for signifi  cantly negative policy rates in all four of the major developed 
economies.NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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MONETARY POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AT THE 
ZERO BOUND
Central banks in the four major developed economies have 
pushed overnight interest rates to near-zero levels. Th  ey also 
have employed an array of nontraditional policies. Most of these 
policies were aimed at restoring normal functioning to ﬁ  nancial 
markets and thus tended to oﬀ  set ﬁ  nancial headwinds rather 
than provide macroeconomic stimulus beyond that implied 
by the level of the policy interest rate. For example, actions by 
the Fed to support the commercial paper (CP) market quickly 
returned the spreads of CP interest rates over Treasury rates 
to historically normal levels from unusually elevated levels 
last fall. Nevertheless, the lingering eﬀ  ects of ﬁ  nancial strains 
are continuing to curtail some of the traditional channels of 
policy stimulus. For example, surveys of bank lending standards 
in all four major developed economies show an exceptionally 
pronounced tightening of credit standards and terms in 2008 
with further tightening (except for Japan) in 2009.10 Th  ese 
headwinds are a major factor behind the forecasts of a slow 
economic recovery.
10. See the Fed’s Senior Loan Oﬃ   cer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, 
the ECB’s Euro Area Bank Lending Survey, the BOJ’s Senior Loan Oﬃ   cer Opin-
ion Survey on Bank Lending Practices at Large Japanese Banks, and the BOE’s 
Credit Conditions Survey.
What More Can Central Banks Do?
One class of policies that can provide additional macroeconomic 
stimulus when traditional policy rates are near the zero bound 
is the large-scale purchase of long-term government bonds and 
other liquid long-term assets, which pushes down interest rates 
at longer maturities. Th  e BOE and the Fed have purchased 
substantial quantities of such assets and these policies have 
reduced long-term interest rates.11 Table 5 lists the movements 
in various interest rates over one- and two-day event windows 
surrounding Fed and BOE communications about such asset 
purchases.12 Th  e movements are always in the expected direc-
11. Th   e ECB is purchasing €60 billion of covered bonds, which represents a 
much smaller program relative to GDP than the BOE and Fed programs. Th  e 
BOJ has stepped up its purchases of government bonds signiﬁ  cantly, but these 
purchases have been concentrated at shorter maturities. See McCauley and 
Ueda (2009).
12. On November 25, 2008, the Fed announced a program to purchase up 
to $100 billion of agency debt and $500 billion of agency mortgage backed 
securities (MBS). On December 1, Chairman Bernanke raised the possibility 
of buying longer-term Treasury securities. On December 16 the Fed conﬁ  rmed 
the agency program and reiterated the possibility of buying Treasury securities. 
On January 28 the Fed disappointed markets by not announcing Treasury 
purchases. On March 18 the Fed announced a Treasury purchase program of 
up to $300 billion and expanded the agency MBS program to $1.25 trillion. 
On March 5 the BOE announced an asset purchase program of £75 billion, 
potentially expandable to £150 billion. Subsequent announcements involved 
much smaller amounts and were largely anticipated by markets. Notably, 
Box 2     Measuring excess unemployment and GDP Gaps
Orphanides (2001) argues that the Fed allowed infl  ation to get out of control in the 1970s because it repeatedly overes-
timated the (negative) size of the US GDP gap. In this view, the Fed did not raise interest rates suffi   ciently in response to 
rising infl  ation because of a misguided attempt to stimulate GDP growth. What are the risks to current policy from poorly 
measured economic slack?
GDP gaps and excess unemployment are notoriously diffi   cult to estimate in real time. (See Kuttner and Posen 2004 for 
the diffi   culties caused by the Japanese slowdown in the 1990s.) However, there has been a sea change in our understanding 
of potential GDP and the structural rate of unemployment (sometimes called the nonaccelerating infl  ation rate of unem-
ployment, or NAIRU) since the 1970s. According to Orphanides, between 1969 and 1988, real-time estimates of the US GDP 
gap were never positive and often exceeded (in magnitude) –10 percent. In comparison, the OECD’s real-time estimates of 
the GDP gaps in Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States were positive as recently as 2007, and even in the current 
deep recession no OECD economy is estimated to have a GDP gap greater than –10 percent. In the 1970s and 1980s, GDP 
gaps were almost always revised in a positive direction, whereas in the 1990s and 2000s, revisions in both directions have 
been common. The main explanation for these diff  erences is that economists are now more aware of the possibility that the 
potential rate of growth and the NAIRU can change over time. Indeed, the IMF and the OECD both project that potential 
growth has slowed substantially this year in the wake of the fi  nancial crisis, and the OECD also projects an increase in the 
NAIRU for most countries.
The depth of the 2008–09 recession is so great that there is little doubt that excess unemployment is positive and GDP 
gaps are negative, even if there is uncertainty about their magnitudes. Moreover, unlike the 1970s when infl  ation was high 
and rising, infl  ation is currently low and falling, which reinforces the policy message from negative GDP gaps.NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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tion—increased purchases of long-term assets reduce long-term 
interest rates. Moreover, the eﬀ  ects appear to be long lasting. 
For example, mortgage rates in the United States—a key target 
of the Fed’s purchases—remain more than 1 percentage point 
lower than they were in mid-November 2008.13
Th   e cumulative change in the 10-year Treasury yield across 
the ﬁ  ve US events shown in table 5 is –94 basis points. If this 
change were attributed to the Fed’s announced purchases of 
$1.75 trillion in longer-term assets, it would imply that each 
$1 trillion in such purchases would lower the 10-year yield 
54 basis points. However, it seems likely that market partici-
pants initially attached a signiﬁ  cant probability to increases in 
the amount of Fed purchases beyond $1.75 trillion, because the 
10-year yield rose on balance after subsequent Fed announce-
ments that did not indicate any increase beyond $1.75 trillion.14 
Th   e cumulative yield movement around all Fed announcements 
concerning asset purchases is –67 basis points, or –39 basis 
points per $1 trillion.15 Th   is estimate must be considered very 
imprecise, however, because it assumes that all the eﬀ  ects of the 
Fed’s actions showed up in market rates within narrow windows 
of time and that market participants did not change their views 
about the Fed purchases (up or down) outside these windows.
Th   e ability of central banks to drive down long-term inter-
est rates by purchasing long-term assets also is consistent with 
existing statistical analysis of the eﬀ  ect of Treasury debt issuance 
on the term structure of interest rates.16 Th   ese studies uniformly 
show that large changes in the net public supply of long-term 
debt securities do have persistent eﬀ  ects on the spread between 
long-term and short-term interest rates of a magnitude (scaled 
by current nominal GDP) roughly consistent with the preced-
ing estimate of –39 basis points per $1 trillion.
Central Banks or Finance Ministries?
Th  e allocation of responsibilities between central banks and 
ﬁ   nance ministries is not universally agreed upon. In some 
countries, central banks hold foreign exchange reserves and 
in other countries ﬁ  nance ministries hold them. Both central 
on November 5 the BOE announced a £25 billion increase in its purchases 
that was interpreted as the likely ﬁ  nal installment, thereby reducing market 
expectations of the ultimate scale of the purchase program. Long-term interest 
rates rose moderately on that day.
13. Long-term Treasury yields have risen modestly since late March, but this 
rise reﬂ  ects an unwinding of safe-haven ﬂ  ows, as long-term corporate yields 
have dropped sharply.
14. Indeed, on November 4, 2009, total targeted purchases were reduced to 
$1.725 trillion.
15. Using diﬀ  erent techniques, Sack (2009) and Schoﬁ  eld (2009) estimate 
that the cumulative eﬀ  ect of Fed asset purchases has been to lower the 10-year 
Treasury yield around 50 basis points.
16. See Friedman (1981), Frankel (1985), Agell and Persson (1992), Kuttner 
(2006), and Greenwood and Vayanos (2008).
banks and ﬁ  nance ministries may extend loans and guarantees 
to ﬁ  nancial institutions. When the monetary policy interest rate 
is constrained near zero, either institution has the ability to push 
down longer-term interest rates by substituting more short-term 
debt for long-term debt.17 However, engaging in such an action 
for macroeconomic stabilization is clearly a function that central 
banks are better organized to conduct because it is a natural 
extension of central bank policy control over interest rates. 
More broadly, central bank eﬀ  orts to ease monetary policy 
at the zero bound need not be limited to buying long-term 
bonds. Purchasing foreign exchange to reduce the value of 
the currency also is a traditional channel for policy ease that 
has been pursued this year by the Swiss National Bank.18 In 
addition, during the Great Depression the Fed lent directly to 
private nonﬁ  nancial businesses. At times over the past 10 years 
or so, the BOJ and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority have 
purchased equities. Exploring the costs and beneﬁ  ts of these 
alternatives is beyond the scope of this paper.
HOW MUCH TO DO?
Th   is section discusses the design and scale of appropriate mone-
tary actions.
United States
Th   e increase in excess unemployment in the United States has 
been larger in relation to the change in the GDP gap than was 
typical in past recessions.19 Th  is development suggests three 
possible inferences: (1) structural unemployment is higher than 
estimated; (2) the GDP gap is more negative than estimated; 
and/or (3) unemployment will fall faster than normal as the 
GDP gap closes. Because monetary policy has a more direct 
eﬀ  ect on GDP than on employment, I calibrate the desired poli-
cy action to close the GDP gap rather than the unemployment 
gap. Th   is choice thus will be too timid if it turns out that the 
GDP gap is more negative than estimated. For that reason, and 
because of the possibility that the structural rate of unemploy-
ment may have risen more than estimated, direct labor market 
policies (Rosen 2009) may be an appropriate companion to the 
policies considered in this paper.
17. When the central bank’s policy rate is not constrained, ﬁ  nance ministry 
swaps of short-term for long-term debt are as likely to raise short-term rates 
as to lower long-term rates. Indeed, Friedman (1981) found evidence of both 
eﬀ  ects.
18. Because exchange rate depreciation shifts demand away from the econo-
mies whose currencies are appreciating, such a strategy is less appropriate 
during a global recession, particularly for large economies.
19. According to the OECD, excess unemployment was about 60 percent 
of the GDP gap in the 1975 and 1982 recessions, whereas it is currently 
estimated to be about 100 percent of the GDP gap.NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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Th  e OECD and the IMF project a GDP gap in 2011 of 
around –2 to –3 percent for the year as a whole. Th  e  implied  gap 
in the fourth quarter of 2011 is a bit smaller than that because 
projected GDP growth that year is above potential. However, 
the CBO GDP gap projection for 2011 is much larger at around 
  –5 percent. Th   us, it seems reasonable for policy to aim at boost-
ing the level of GDP around 3 percent by the end of 2011.
According to the Fed’s Federal Reserve Board (FRB)/US 
model, a 75–basis point reduction of the 10-year Treasury yield 
would raise GDP 3 percent after eight quarters (Reifschneider, 
Tetlow, and Williams 1999). Th  e lower Treasury rates are 
assumed to pass through to private long-term rates and cause 
equity prices to rise 13 percent and the dollar to fall 5 percent. 
In the event that other central banks also adopted such policies, 
there would be no depreciation of the dollar but US exports 
instead would be boosted by higher foreign aggregate demand. 
Overall, this policy is equivalent to a 175–basis point reduction 
in the federal funds rate.
Based on the evidence discussed in the previous section, 
to reduce the 10-year Treasury yield by 75 basis points, the Fed 
would need to buy about $2 trillion in debt securities (with an 
average maturity of roughly seven years) over and above what 
the Fed has already committed to buy. Th   ese purchases would 
be announced now but could be implemented over the course 
of 2010.
Th  ere is little chance that this policy would eliminate 
the GDP gap or return inﬂ   ation to target before late next 
year. During 2010, policymakers would be able to adjust the 
program in light of incoming data about the pace of recovery 
in GDP and inﬂ  ation. Even if it became apparent only after 
purchases were completed that GDP growth or inﬂ  ation was 
considerably stronger than expected, there would be some abil-
ity for policymakers to implement a correction through a sharp 
temporary increase in short-term interest rates.20 Such a scenario 
is described in the ﬁ  nal section of this paper.
It is possible that the lingering strains in ﬁ  nancial markets 
20. Although the peak eﬀ  ect of monetary policy occurs after about two years, 
there is a substantial eﬀ  ect within one year that gives policymakers some abil-
ity to “take back” stimulus that was previously applied.
would damp the eﬀ  ect of this policy action on the economy, so 
that the full 3-percent increment to GDP would not be achieved. 
Th   ere is little evidence with which to judge such a claim. But, if 
it were believed to be true, the correct policy response would be 
to conduct an even more aggressive policy. Box 3 explains that 
concerns about asset price bubbles should not prevent central 
banks from stabilizing GDP and inﬂ  ation.
Euro Area
Th   e euro area is projected to have a GDP gap roughly as large 
as that in the United States in 2011, but the rate at which the 
gap is projected to close is slower than in the United States. 
Moreover, inﬂ  ation is projected to be more persistently below 
target in the euro area. Th  us, the euro area needs even more 
stimulus than the United States. 
Th   e ECB has room to lower its policy rate, the main reﬁ  nanc-
ing rate, which is currently set at 1 percent. Th   us, a reasonable 
policy prescription is for the ECB to lower the main reﬁ  nancing 
rate to 0.5 percent, to continue to extend unlimited 12-month 
credit to banks at this rate, and to purchase €1 trillion in longer-
term debt securities, which is a share of GDP equivalent to the 
$2 trillion in recommended purchases by the Fed.
Japan
Uncertainty about the Japanese GDP gap is large, but Japanese 
inﬂ  ation is far below its desired level and likely has caused the 
economy to perform below its potential for more than a decade. 
Th   e BOJ should state more clearly its intention to return inﬂ  a-
tion to at least 1 percent. In addition, the BOJ should greatly 
increase its purchases of debt securities.21 Th  ese purchases 
should be at longer maturities than those purchased previously, 
which had relatively short terms to maturity (McCauley and 
Ueda 2009). With the 10-year Japanese government bond yield 
already very low at 1.3 percent, reducing long-term yields in 
Japan is likely to require larger asset purchases than elsewhere. 
However, to the extent that the BOJ is able to raise long-term 
inﬂ  ation expectations, it can stimulate GDP growth even without 
lowering the nominal bond yield. Overall, the additional BOJ 
purchases should be considerably larger in relation to GDP than 
those proposed for the United States and the euro area, around 
¥100 trillion in 2010 with a promise to buy a further ¥100 tril-
lion in 2011 if the core inﬂ  ation rate (excluding food and energy 
prices) remains negative over the 12 months of 2010. 
21. Th   e announcement on December 1 of an additional ¥10 trillion of three-
month loans does not reﬂ  ect a substantive move in this direction.
 Central banks in the main developed 
economies should push long-term interest 
rates 75 basis points below the levels 
they would otherwise be by purchasing 
a combined $6 trillion in long-term 
public and private debt securities.NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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United Kingdom
Th   e policy prescription for the United Kingdom depends criti-
cally on the weight one attaches to the BOE forecast versus the 
other forecasts. Because the BOE forecast for GDP growth is 
higher, and the implicit BOE estimate of the current GDP gap 
is lower than those of all other main forecasts, the BOE may be 
too optimistic about the horizon over which the GDP gap will 
be closed. Th   e other forecasters generally view the UK economy 
to be in a slightly worse position than that of the US economy. 
Shading this outlook a bit higher in light of the BOE forecast 
leads to a similar policy prescription to that for the United 
States. Accordingly, the BOE should expand its purchases of 
long-term debt securities by £200 billion in 2010.22 
BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF MONETARY 
AND FISCAL STIMULUS
Table 6 explores the budgetary impacts of the monetary 
policy proposed for the United States along with those of a 
22. Th   is expansion is large relative to the outstanding stock of gilts, and the 
UK corporate bond market is relatively small. An alternative to buying sterling 
bonds is to buy the equivalent amount of high-grade foreign-currency bonds 
and convert the stream of interest and principal to sterling through the large 
and liquid long-term currency swap market.
ﬁ  scal stimulus calibrated to have the same eﬀ  ect on GDP and 
inﬂ  ation.23 Monetary stimulus reduces the deﬁ  cit and ﬁ  scal 
stimulus increases it. Th  e diﬀ  erence in the deﬁ  cit under the 
two policies peaks at around 2 percent of GDP in 2011, or 
about $300 billion. Compared with the status quo, additional 
monetary stimulus gets the economy back to potential sooner 
and permanently reduces the national debt by about 3 percent 
of GDP. Fiscal stimulus also gets the economy back to poten-
tial sooner than the status quo, but it permanently raises the 
national debt by about 1 percent of GDP. If either stimulus 
policy proves to be more inﬂ  ationary than expected, the Fed 
will have to raise interest rates (and federal interest expense) 
sharply, but even in such a scenario, the national debt is likely 
to end up lower with monetary stimulus than without it. 
Baseline
Th  e  ﬁ  rst section of the table is a baseline for key macroeconomic 
variables inﬂ  uenced primarily by the OECD forecast for 2010 
and 2011 and then extrapolated to 2018. Th  is  baseline  reﬂ  ects 
“status quo” policies, including the asset purchases that the 
Fed has previously announced. Short- and long-term inter-
23. Th   ese scenarios are designed to illustrate plausible potential outcomes and 
are not based on any speciﬁ  c empirical model. A detailed explanation of the 
table is provided in the appendix to this paper.
Box 3     Blowing bubbles?
Concern about asset price bubbles in the main developed economies is not warranted in the near term. As Mishkin (2009) 
reminds us, the harm caused by bursting bubbles arises almost entirely from excessive leverage used to fi  nance asset 
purchases. At present, leverage is falling as banks continue to tighten credit standards and terms. Should unsafe lend-
ing practices return, fi  nancial supervisors need to aggressively shut them down. (Posen 2009 discusses systematic policies 
to counter lending booms and busts.) Equity prices have risen, but from excessively low levels, and price-earnings ratios 
remain within historical ranges. It is important to recognize that current and expected future low interest rates are a fun-
damental element of asset valuation that supports high asset prices. A bubble occurs only when asset prices signifi  cantly 
exceed their fundamental value.
In the emerging markets, there is also little evidence of asset price bubbles, but there may be more reason for concern. 
The monetary policy stance appropriate for the developed economies is not likely to be appropriate for emerging markets 
that were hit less hard by the recent recession. Holding policy interest rates too low will lead to a new boom and bust of 
economic activity, infl  ation, and asset prices. Raising policy interest rates in emerging markets will damp this cycle both 
directly and indirectly through stronger currencies. Central banks need to take into consideration both the interest-rate and 
the exchange-rate channels of monetary transmission when setting policy so that they do not overtighten. In some cases, if 
capital infl  ows are deemed to exceed an economy’s capacity to usefully employ them, capital controls may be warranted. 
The potential for rapidly rising commodity prices is another common concern. Rising commodity prices are to be ex-
pected as global economic growth resumes. However, most commodities are not subject to signifi  cant and persistent price 
bubbles because it is costly or diffi   cult to store them. (Precious metals are an obvious exception.) For example, total private-
sector storage capacity in the petroleum market is only a small fraction of annual consumption. In the absence of storage, 
commodity prices must equate production supply with consumption demand continuously.NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
9
est rates gradually rise to historic averages. Growth picks up 
and peaks in 2012 before tapering oﬀ   toward potential growth 
of 2.5 percent.24 Th  e GDP gap is closed by 2014. Inﬂ  ation 
remains low for the ﬁ  rst two years and then gradually returns 
to its target rate of 2 percent. Th   e budget deﬁ  cit is large in the 
near term and remains over $1 trillion per year through 2014, 
but it declines steadily as a percent of GDP as tax increases 
and spending restraint are assumed to put the economy on a 
more stable trajectory. Th  is  deﬁ  cit trajectory is notably higher 
than that in CBO’s long-run baseline, reﬂ  ecting an assump-
tion that tax increases and spending cuts will not occur as fast 
as CBO assumes. Th   e ratio of net federal debt to GDP rises to 
80.3 percent by 2016 and then holds constant.
Monetary Stimulus: Expected Outcome
Th   e second section presents the expected outcome under the 
additional monetary stimulus proposed. Th  e Fed is assumed 
to purchase $2 trillion in additional long-term assets in 2010, 
mainly Treasury securities with an average maturity of seven 
years.25 Th   is action is assumed to lower the 10-year Treasury 
yield 75 basis points and the 7-year yield 60 basis points, 
both relative to baseline. Th  e  eﬀ  ect on the 7-year yield decays 
by 10 basis points per year as the remaining maturity of the 
purchased assets declines. Th  is policy boosts GDP growth 
1 percentage point in 2010 and 2 percentage points in 2011, 
closing the output gap by the end of 2011. Th   e Fed is assumed 
to hold the short-term interest rate at baseline in 2010 and 
2011, but it raises the short-term rate faster in 2012 under this 
scenario than in the baseline in order to return growth to its 
potential rate and prevent inﬂ  ation from exceeding its target. 
Inﬂ  ation picks up somewhat earlier in this scenario than in 
the baseline. 
Th  e federal deﬁ  cit is uniformly lower in this scenario, 
24. Th   e potential growth rate of GDP is assumed to be 1.5 percent in 2010, 
2.0 percent in 2011, and 2.5 percent thereafter. Th   e CBO and the Fed project 
long-run potential GDP growth slightly above 2.5 percent. Slower potential 
growth in 2010 and 2011 reﬂ  ects both lower investment and the eﬀ  ects of 
ﬁ  nancial stress and economic restructuring.
25. For simplicity, all the long-term assets are assumed to have a maturity of 
seven years.
mainly reﬂ  ecting higher revenues in 2011 and 2012 arising 
from faster growth and higher inﬂ  ation that are only partially 
oﬀ  set by higher spending to keep up with inﬂ  ation.26 Although 
the federal government does save money from issuing long-
term debt at lower rates, it has to roll over its short-term debt 
at higher rates in 2012, so the cumulative reduction in federal 
interest expense is small.27 Th   e net income on the Fed’s port-
folio rises at ﬁ  rst but then falls below baseline in later years as 
the spread between the interest it earns on its long-term assets 
and the interest it pays on the short-term bank reserves created 
to buy the assets turns negative in 2013–17.28 Fed net inter-
est income does not turn negative, however, because a large 
portion of its liabilities are zero interest–bearing currency.29 
Th  e  long-run  eﬀ  ect of this policy is to lower the federal 
debt by nearly 3 percent of GDP.
Fiscal Stimulus: Expected Outcome
Th   e third section of the table presents the expected outcome 
under a ﬁ  scal stimulus designed to have the same impact on 
GDP and inﬂ  ation as the monetary stimulus in the second 
section. According to the Fed’s FRB/US model, either an 
increase in government spending of nearly $250 billion per 
year in 2010 and 2011 or a cut in personal income taxes of 
more than $400 billion per year or some combination of the 
two would increase GDP 3 percent after two years. Th  e  table 
displays the results from an increase in federal expenditures of 
$250 billion per year in 2010 and 2011. Expenditures return 
to baseline in real terms starting in 2012.
Th  e Fed is assumed to set the short-term interest rate 
as in the baseline and the ﬁ  scal stimulus is not assumed to 
raise long-term interest rates above baseline.30 Th  e paths of 
growth and inﬂ  ation are the same as in the previous scenario, 
reﬂ  ecting the assumption that the two policy shocks provide 
a similar degree of macroeconomic stimulus. Th  e  deﬁ  cit rises 
sharply in 2010 and 2011 before dropping back to slightly 
below baseline in 2012 as spending drops and revenues remain 
26. Federal revenues are assumed to increase by 20 percent of the increase in 
nominal GDP. Federal spending is assumed to increase in proportion to the 
price level. 
27. Interest income and expense are each year is based on the debt stock and 
interest rate at the end of the previous year. Interest on the debt stock that is 
rolled over each year moves with the short-term and long-term interest rate 
under the assumption that 25 percent of the debt is short term and 75 percent 
is long term. Th   e implied average maturity of the debt is just over ﬁ  ve years, 
which is close to the historical average.
28. Th   e Fed is assumed to hold its long-term assets to maturity.
29. Currency demand is assumed to grow in proportion to nominal GDP.
30. In reality, a substantial ﬁ  scal stimulus probably would raise long-term 
interest rates a modest amount, making the true cost of this policy somewhat 
higher than calculated here.
Compared with the status quo, additional 
monetary stimulus gets the economy back to 
potential sooner and permanently reduces 
the national debt by about 3 percent of GDP.NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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buoyed by the stronger economy. Th  e debt ratio rises above 
baseline and remains permanently higher, although the higher 
revenues generated by the earlier recovery hold down the 
increase somewhat at ﬁ  rst.
In the long run, the federal debt rises slightly more than 
1 percent of GDP.
Infl  ation Scare
Two key risks of applying more stimulus are that current fore-
casts could be underestimating the underlying strength of the 
economy and that the stimulus policies may be more power-
ful than expected.31 Either way, inﬂ   ation would rise more 
quickly than expected, forcing the Fed to raise interest rates. 
Higher interest rates add to the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit both directly and 
through the Fed’s balance sheet. Th  e  ﬁ  nal two sections of the 
table examine the implications of such an “inﬂ  ation scare.” 
In both scenarios, GDP growth is 2 percentage points higher 
than baseline in 2010 and inﬂ  ation is 0.5 percentage points 
higher. 
To damp growth and prevent an excessive rise in inﬂ  a-
tion, the Fed raises the short-term interest rate to 6 percent in 
2011 and 5 percent in 2012 before returning it to 4 percent 
in 2013. Long-term rates also jump up, though by a bit less 
in the monetary stimulus scenario than in the ﬁ  scal scenario. 
Federal revenue surges under both scenarios, but this time 
federal interest expense also rises signiﬁ  cantly.
In the monetary scenario, the Fed incurs temporary losses 
on its portfolio in 2012–13 because its long-term assets yield 
only 2.8 percent while it pays up to 6 percent on some of its 
short-term liabilities. Overall, the debt ratio still falls relative 
to baseline, but by only 1 percent of GDP compared with 
almost 3 percent of GDP in the monetary expected outcome 
scenario. 
In the ﬁ  scal inﬂ  ation scare scenario, the debt ratio rises by 
almost 4 percent of GDP, compared with 1 percent of GDP 
in the ﬁ  scal expected outcome scenario, reﬂ  ecting the higher 
interest expense on the federal debt.
CONCLUSION
Altogether then, either monetary or ﬁ  scal stimulus would help 
to attain more satisfactory outcomes for economic activity, 
employment, and inﬂ  ation than those envisaged by the main 
31. Of course, there are also risks that the economy may be weaker than 
forecasted or that the stimulus policies will be less eﬀ  ective than expected. In 
these circumstances, stimulus is clearly preferable to the status quo. 
economic forecasts. Monetary stimulus has the added advan-
tage of also reducing net public debt, whereas ﬁ  scal stimulus 
increases net debt. In total, central banks in the four main 
developed economies should buy an additional $6 trillion 
in longer-term debt securities, which is expected to reduce 
10-year bond yields around 75 basis points.
For the United States, the proposed monetary stimulus 
is calibrated to boost GDP about 3 percent relative to current 
forecasts by the end of 2011, which should return GDP close 
to its potential. A similarly sized stimulus (scaled by GDP) is 
proposed for the United Kingdom. A slightly larger stimulus 
is indicated for the euro area, reﬂ  ecting weaker growth fore-
casts in the absence of additional stimulus. Th  ere is greater 
uncertainty about the size of the GDP gap in Japan, but the 
persistent deﬂ  ation in Japan suggests that even more aggressive 
stimulus is needed there than in the other three economies. 
Th   e risks to these policy proposals appear balanced. On 
the one hand, economies may prove weaker than forecasted or 
the policies may be less eﬀ  ective than expected. On the other 
hand, economies may have greater underlying strength than 
forecasted or the policies may be more eﬀ  ective than expected. 
In either case, there is considerable scope for adjusting policies 
as new data become available. Th  ere is little risk that any of 
these economies will run out of excess capacity in the next 
year or so, and, if anything, the risks to inﬂ  ation appear tilted 
to the downside. Of course, if and when inﬂ  ation pressures 
do return, policymakers must act resolutely to maintain price 
stability. 
APPENDIX: CONSTRUCTION OF MONETARY 
AND FISCAL SCENARIOS
Baseline
Th   e baseline is roughly based on the OECD forecast for 2010 
and 2011, which includes projections for GDP growth, the 
GDP gap, inﬂ  ation, short-term and long-term interest rates, and 
ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits. Beyond 2011 potential GDP is assumed to grow at 
2.5 percent, inﬂ  ation to remain steady at 2 percent, and interest 
rates to revert roughly to post-1990 averages. Federal spending 
is assumed to be tightly constrained through 2013 and then to 
grow with nominal GDP. Revenues increase to keep the deﬁ  cit 
as a share of GDP gradually declining to 3.5 percent by 2017, 
at which point the debt/GDP ratio stabilizes. Th   e federal debt is 
assumed to be 25 percent short term and 75 percent long term 
and deﬁ  cits are ﬁ  nanced in a similar proportion. All long-term 
debt is assumed to have a 7-year maturity. Interest expense on 
the net federal debt is based on past interest rates according to 
the maturity cohort in which it was incurred. Th   e initial stock of NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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long-term debt is assumed to bear an interest rate of 3.5 percent, 
which matches the implied total interest expense for 2010 to the 
CBO’s projection. Fed assets are composed of $1.7 trillion in 
long-term debt purchased in 2009 at an average interest rate of 
4 percent.32 Th   ese assets are assumed to have a seven-year matu-
rity. Fed liabilities consist of currency, which pays no interest, 
and bank reserves, which pay the short-term rate of interest. Th  e 
stock of currency was $913 billion at year end 2009 and it is 
assumed to grow in proportion with nominal GDP. 
Monetary Stimulus: Expected Outcome
Th  e paths for interest rates, GDP, and inﬂ  ation are adjusted 
to reﬂ  ect the assumed impacts of additional Fed purchases of 
$2 trillion of 7-year Treasury securities. Federal spending diﬀ  ers 
from baseline in proportion to the diﬀ  erence in the price level, 
i.e., real spending is held constant. Federal revenues (exclud-
ing income transferred from the Fed) diﬀ  er from baseline by 
20 percent of any change in nominal GDP. Federal interest 
expense moves with the path of interest rates and debt stocks. 
Fed net income moves with changes in interest rates and the 
increase in its holdings of long-term assets. At the margin, these 
assets are entirely ﬁ  nanced by increases in bank reserves, which 
pay the short-term rate of interest.
32. Most of the 2009 Fed asset purchases were agency debt and mortgage-
backed securities, which have a higher yield than Treasury securities.
Fiscal Stimulus: Expected Outcome
Interest rates are unchanged from baseline. GDP and inﬂ  ation 
move to reﬂ  ect the assumed impacts of extra federal spending, 
which are calibrated to be the same as those of the monetary 
stimulus above. Federal spending increases by $250 billion in 
2010 and 2011 plus an additional amount needed to hold origi-
nal spending constant in real terms. Federal revenues increase 
by 20 percent of the increase in nominal GDP. Federal interest 
expense rises with the federal net debt. Fed net income is slightly 
higher than baseline, reﬂ  ecting higher currency demand from 
the increase in nominal GDP, but the increase in net income is 
less than proportional to the increase in nominal GDP, so Fed 
net income falls slightly as a ratio to GDP.
Infl  ation Scare Scenarios
GDP and inﬂ  ation rebound more vigorously in 2010 than in 
the expected outcome scenarios. Th   e Fed pushes up the short-
term interest rate in 2011 to stabilize GDP and inﬂ  ation at 
desired levels. Th   e long-term interest rate also rises, but by less 
in the monetary scenario than in the ﬁ  scal scenario, reﬂ  ecting 
the downward eﬀ  ect of Fed asset purchases on the long-term 
rate. Federal interest expense is sharply higher beginning in 
2012, pushing up the deﬁ  cit and debt levels compared with the 
expected outcome scenarios. In the monetary inﬂ  ation scare 
scenario, Fed net income turns negative in 2012 and 2013, 
reﬂ  ecting the temporarily high cost of ﬁ  nancing the long-term 
assets that were purchased in 2010.NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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Fed (Nov)3 10.0 4.9 –0.3 n.a. 1.2 1.5
OECD (Nov) 10.0 4.9 –0.3 –4.9 1.1 0.9
Blue Chip (Nov) 9.9 4.1 –0.3 n.a. 1.2 1.0
IMF (Oct)    9.3Y n.a. –1.1 –4.5 1.6 1.6Y
CBO (Aug) 10.1 5.3 –1.0 –7.0 1.2 1.7
2010
Fed (Nov)3 9.5 4.4 3.0 n.a. 1.5 1.3
OECD (Nov) 9.7 4.5 2.5 –3.9 1.3 0.9
Blue Chip (Nov) 9.6 3.8 2.9 n.a. 1.7 1.5
IMF (Oct) 10.1Y n.a. 1.9 –3.9 1.5 1.5Y
Mussa (Sep) 8.8 n.a. 4.0Y n.a. n.a. n.a.
CBO (Aug) 9.9 5.1 2.8 –7.0 1.1 0.8
2011
Fed (Nov)3 8.4 3.3 4.0 n.a. 1.5 1.3
OECD (Nov) 8.7 3.4 3.0 –2.8 1.4 1.1
Blue Chip (Oct) 9.0Y 3.2Y 3.1Y n.a. 2.0Y 1.7Y
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.8Y –2.2 2.1 1.4Y
CBO (Aug) 8.5 3.7 3.8 –5.2 0.8 0.5
2012
Fed (Nov)3 7.2 2.1 4.2 n.a. 1.6 1.4
Blue Chip (Oct) 8.1Y 2.3Y 3.3Y n.a. 2.1Y 1.8Y
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.6Y –0.9 2.3 1.8Y
CBO (Aug) 7.2Y 2.4Y 5.0Y –2.4 0.7Y 0.6Y
2013
Blue Chip (Oct) 7.3Y 1.5Y 3.0Y n.a. 2.2Y 1.9Y
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.5Y –0.1 2.2 1.9Y
CBO (Aug) 5.6Y 0.8Y 4.5Y –0.4 0.8Y 0.8Y
n.a. = not available.
Y = Denotes whole year data. 
1. Consumer price index (CPI) for Blue Chip, IMF, and OECD.  Personal consumption expenditure (PCE) for CBO and Fed.
2. GDP defl  ator for Blue Chip, IMF, and OECD.  Core PCE defl  ator for CBO and Fed. 
3.  Midpoint of central tendency. 
Sources:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Aspen Publishers (Blue Chip), Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), Peterson Institute for International Economics (Mussa), and Congressional Budget Offi   ce (CBO).NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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(year over year, 
percent)
2009
ECB (Dec)3 n.a. n.a. –4.0 n.a. 0.3 n.a.
OECD (Nov) 9.4 1.5 –4.0 –4.5 0.2 1.0
SPF (Nov) 9.5 1.0 –3.9 n.a. 0.3 n.a.
Commission (Nov) 9.5 n.a. –4.0 –2.9 0.3 1.3
IMF (Oct) 9.9 n.a. –4.2 –2.9 0.3 0.6
2010
ECB (Dec)3 n.a. n.a. 0.8 n.a. 1.3 n.a.
OECD (Nov) 10.6 2.4 0.9 –4.5 0.9 0.5
SPF (Nov) 10.6 2.1 1.0 n.a. 1.2 n.a.
Commission (Nov) 10.7 n.a. 0.7 –3.0 1.1 1.1
IMF (Oct) 11.7 n.a. 0.3 –3.1 0.8 0.6
Mussa (Sep) n.a. n.a. 2.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011
ECB (Dec)3 n.a. n.a. 1.2 n.a. 1.4 n.a.
OECD (Nov) 10.8 2.3 1.7 –3.8 0.7 0.7
SPF (Nov) 10.4 1.9 1.6 n.a. 1.6 n.a.
Commission (Nov) 10.9 n.a. 1.5 –2.5 1.5 1.7
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 1.3 –2.5 0.8 0.9
2012
Consensus (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.0 n.a. 1.8 n.a.
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 1.7 –1.6 1.1 1.1
2013
Consensus (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.0 n.a. 2.1 n.a.
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.0 –0.8 1.3 1.3
n.a. = not available.
1. Harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP).
2. GDP defl  ator. 
3. Midpoint of range.
Sources: European Central Bank staff   forecast (ECB) and Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Consen-
sus Economics, Inc., European Commission, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Peterson Institute for International Economics (Mussa). Consensus projections not shown 
for 2009–11 because they are nearly identical to SPF and do not include a long-run unemployment rate estimate.NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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(year over year, 
percent)
2009
OECD (Nov) 5.2 1.2 –5.3 –3.3 –1.2 0.0
Consensus (Nov) 5.3 n.a. –5.7 n.a. –1.2 –5.1
BOJ (Oct)3 n.a. n.a. –3.2 n.a. –1.5 –5.2
IMF (Oct) 5.4 n.a. –5.4 –7.0 –1.1 –0.2
2010
OECD (Nov) 5.6 1.6 1.8 –2.1 –0.9 –1.7
Consensus (Nov) 5.8 n.a. 1.4 n.a. –0.9 –1.2
BOJ (Oct)3 n.a. n.a. 1.2 n.a. –0.8 –1.4
IMF (Oct) 6.1 n.a. 1.7 –5.5 –0.8 –0.8
Mussa (Sep) n.a. n.a. 2.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011
OECD (Nov) 5.4 1.4 2.0 –1.0 –0.5 –0.8
BOJ (Oct)3 n.a. n.a. 2.1 n.a. –0.4 –0.7
Consensus (Oct) n.a. n.a. 1.4 n.a. –0.2 n.a.
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.4 –3.6 –0.4 –1.0
2012
Consensus (Oct) n.a. n.a. 1.8 n.a. 0.4 n.a.
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.3 –2.1 0.1 –1.2
2013
Consensus (Oct) n.a. n.a. 1.7 n.a. 0.9 n.a.
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.0 –1.0 0.6 –0.6
n.a. = not available.
1. Consumer price index (CPI).
2. GDP defl  ator for IMF and OECD.  Corporate goods price index for Consensus and BOJ. 
3. BOJ forecasts are for fi  scal years.
Sources: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Consensus Economics, Inc., Bank of Japan (BOJ), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Peterson 
Institute for International Economics (Mussa).NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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BOE (Nov)3 n.a. n.a. –2.8 n.a. 1.9 n.a.
OECD (Nov) 8.8 3.3 –2.9 –6.2 1.7 0.8
Consensus (Nov) n.a. n.a. –4.5Y n.a. 2.1Y 1.3Y
Commission (Nov) 7.8Y n.a. –2.8 –3.7 1.5 1.1Y
IMF (Oct) 7.6Y n.a. –2.5 –4.9 1.2 1.3Y
2010
BOE-Market (Nov)3 n.a. n.a. 2.7 n.a. 1.6 n.a.
BOE-Constant (Nov)3 n.a. n.a. 3.1 n.a. 1.7 n.a.
OECD (Nov) 9.5 3.8 1.9 –6.2 1.0 1.0
Consensus (Nov) na n.a. 1.2Y n.a. 2.0Y 2.3Y
Commission (Nov) 8.7Y n.a. 1.2 –3.7 1.3 1.7Y
IMF (Oct) 9.3Y n.a. 1.3 –4.7 1.3 1.0Y
Mussa (Sep) n.a. n.a. 2.5Y n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011
BOE-Market (Nov)3 n.a. n.a. 3.0 n.a. 1.7 n.a.
BOE-Constant (Nov)3 n.a. n.a. 3.5 n.a. 2.4 n.a.
OECD (Nov) 9.4 3.5 2.5 –5.5 0.6 0.7
Commission (Nov) 8.0Y n.a. 2.4 –2.9 1.7 2.0Y
Consensus (Oct) n.a. n.a. 1.8Y n.a. 1.8Y n.a.
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.5Y –3.5 1.7 2.6Y
2012
BOE-Market (Nov)3 n.a. n.a. 2.3 n.a. 2.2 n.a.
Consensus (Oct) n.a. n.a. 1.9Y n.a. 2.1Y n.a.
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.9Y –2.2 1.9 2.8Y
2013
Consensus (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.3Y n.a. 2.8Y n.a.
IMF (Oct) n.a. n.a. 2.9Y –1.0 2.0 2.8Y
n.a. = not available.
Y = Denotes whole year data.
1. Consumer price index (CPI).
2. GDP defl  ator for OECD, Commission, and IMF.  Output price for Consensus. 
3. Mean forecast.  “Market” assumes market interest rate expectations.  “Constant” assumes the short-term interest rate is held constant at 0.5 percent (not available for 2012).
Sources:  Bank of England (BOE), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Consensus Economics, Inc., European Commission, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and Peterson Institute for International Economics (Mussa).NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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Table 5     Yield eff  ects of central bank asset purchase announcements (basis points)
United States United Kingdom
2008 2009 2009
November 25 December 1–2 December 16–17 January 28–29 March18–19 March 5
Buy more Buy more Buy more Buy less Buy more Buy more*
1-year Treasury 0 –13 –5 4 –9 0
10-year Treasury –24 –27 –33 30 –40 –28
10-year swap –32 –23 –53 5 –37 –12
10+-year 
   corporate**
–16 –27 –57 23 –29 –15
*All long-term rates fell signifi  cantly further the following day.
**Based on price indexes assuming 6 percent coupon and 12 years to maturity. US data are Barclays long-term corporate aggregate. United Kingdom data are FTSE Sterling 
10–15 year corporate.
Note: Event windows are one-day for morning announcements and two-day for afternoon announcements. 
Source: Datastream.NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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Table 6     Stimulus policies and the federal debt (Q4 values, percent)
2010 2011 2012 2015 2018
Baseline
Short interest rate 0.3 1.5 3.0 4.0 4.0
Long interest rate 3.4 4.2 4.7 5.0 5.0
GDP gap –4.0 –3.0 –1.5 0.0 0.0
Infl  ation rate 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.0
Fed net income/GDP 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2
Defi  cit/GDP 10.0 9.0 8.0 5.0 3.5
Net debt/GDP 61.6 68.2 72.6 79.7 80.3
Monetary stimulus—expected outcome
Short interest rate 0.3 1.5 4.0 4.0 4.0
Long interest rate 2.8 3.7 4.3 4.9 5.0
GDP gap –3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Infl  ation rate 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0
Fed net income/GDP 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.2
Defi  cit/GDP 9.7 7.7 7.2 4.8 3.3
Net debt/GDP 60.8 64.8 69.2 77.3 77.6
Fiscal stimulus—expected outcome
Short interest rate 0.3 1.5 3.0 4.0 4.0
Long interest rate 3.4 4.2 4.7 5.0 5.0
GDP gap –3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Infl  ation rate 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0
Fed net income/GDP 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2
Defi  cit/GDP 11.4 9.7 7.6 5.0 3.5
Net debt/GDP 62.5 68.4 73.0 80.9 81.4
Monetary stimulus—infl  ation scare
Short interest rate 0.3 6.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
Long interest rate 2.8 5.0 4.7 4.9 5.0
GDP gap –2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Infl  ation rate 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Fed net income/GDP 0.4 0.7 –0.2 0.1 0.2
Defi  cit/GDP 9.4 7.7 8.7 5.0 3.5
Net debt/GDP 59.8 64.0 69.9 78.7 79.4
Fiscal stimulus—infl  ation scare
Short interest rate 0.3 6.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
Long interest rate 3.4 5.5 5.1 5.0 5.0
GDP gap –2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Infl  ation rate 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Fed net income/GDP 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
Defi  cit/GDP 11.4 9.7 8.7 5.3 3.8
Net debt/GDP 62.5 68.4 74.1 83.0 84.0
Note: The short interest rate is the federal funds rate. The long interest rate is the 7-year Treasury rate. The infl  ation rate is the four-quarter 
change in the GDP defl  ator. Net income on the Fed’s portfolio is applied toward reducing the defi  cit and debt. Net debt is debt held by the 
public and does not subtract fi  nancial assets such those related to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the housing agencies.
Source: Author’s projections and calculations.NUMBER PB09-22  DECEMBER 2009
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